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v. 
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AIG LIFE INSURANCE CO.-MCS;  
ESSO STANDARD OIL COMPANY (PUERTO RICO) 
 
(D. V.I. No. 3-09-cv-00118) 
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PATRICIA BENJAMIN 
 
v. 
 
ESSO STANDARD OIL COMPANY (PUERTO RICO) 
 
(D. V.I. No. 3-09-cv-00119) 
 
 
 
PATRICIA BENJAMIN 
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ESSO VIRGIN ISLANDS, INC.;  
AIG LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PUERTO RICO 
 
(D. V.I. No. 3-10-cv-00074) 
 
                          Patricia Benjamin, 
 
        Appellant 
 
      
 
On Appeal from the District Court  
of the Virgin Islands – Appellate Division 
(District Court Nos.: 3-09-cv-00072; 3-09-cv-00102; 3-09-cv-00118;  
3-09-cv-00119 and 3-10-cv-00074) 
District Judge:  Juan R. Sanchez 
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Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 23, 2014) 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Patricia Benjamin appeals from an order dismissing her four consolidated lawsuits 
against ExxonMobil entities for failure to prosecute.  Benjamin had filed the lawsuits on 
behalf of then-minor Ronald Williams, to secure employee death benefits from 
ExxonMobil following the death of his father, Fitzroy Williams.  During the pendency of 
the lawsuits, Ronald Williams reached the age of majority, and Patricia Benjamin was 
dismissed as a named party.  Benjamin now objects to her dismissal as a party, and 
contests the order dismissing the consolidated lawsuits.  For the reasons set forth below, 
we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Benjamin as a party and dismiss the remainder 
of her appeal for lack of standing.   
I. Background 
 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the facts 
necessary to the disposition of this appeal.  Fitzroy Williams (“Fitzroy”) died in 1994 
while employed by Esso Virgin Islands, Inc., an ExxonMobil affiliate.  Appellant Patricia 
Benjamin, acting as guardian of Fitztroy’s then-minor son Ronald Williams, filed four 
lawsuits against various ExxonMobil entities (“ExxonMobil”) seeking to obtain 
employee benefits allegedly owed to Ronald Williams as Fitzroy’s beneficiary.  The 
District Court of the Virgin Islands then consolidated Benjamin’s lawsuits  (the 
“consolidated actions”).  
 Faced with the possibility of multiple rival claims from Fitzroy’s living family 
members, Administrator-Benefits for the ExxonMobil Savings Plan (“Administrator-
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Benefits”) filed an interpleader action in the District Court of the Virgin Islands (the  
“interpleader action”).  The purpose of the interpleader action was to determine Fitzroy’s 
beneficiary and avoid multiple judgments against ExxonMobil for the same set of 
benefits.  Benjamin unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the interpleader action for lack of 
jurisdiction, but did not file an answer to the interpleader action.  
A. Trial of the Interpleader Action 
 The interpleader action was tried on December 6, 2010 but neither Patricia 
Benjamin nor Ronald Williams attended.  Following the bench trial, on April 6, 2011, the 
District Court ruled that Ronald Williams was Fitzroy Williams’ sole beneficiary and 
therefore was entitled to $47,156.92 in benefits.  (Suppl. App. 267b-272b.)  In an order 
accompanying its opinion, the District Court instructed any other potential beneficiary to 
file notice within 30 days if they wished to contest the District Court’s beneficiary 
determination.  (Id. at 273b.)  No such notice was filed.  
 Administrator-Benefits deposited Ronald Williams’ award in the District Court’s 
registry.  To our knowledge, Ronald Williams has not yet claimed the $47,156.92 but 
remains entitled to do so.  
B.  Order Removing Benjamin as Named Plaintiff 
 Simultaneous to the disposition of the interpleader action, the District Court 
removed Benjamin as a named plaintiff.  ExxonMobil first filed a notice objecting to 
Benjamin’s continued status as a named plaintiff in the consolidated actions on 
November 22, 2010.  (Suppl. App. 260b-265b.)  ExxonMobil alleged that Benjamin’s 
guardianship of Ronald Williams had terminated because Ronald Williams had turned 18, 
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the age of majority in the Virgin Islands.  Benjamin did not file any opposition to this 
notice.  The District Court granted ExxonMobil’s objection, and dismissed Benjamin as 
plaintiff on April 6, 2011.  (Id. at 275b-76b.)  In doing so, the District Court held that 
Ronald turned 18 on February 26, 2009, and at that time became an emancipated adult.  
The District Court ordered that Ronald Williams file a motion to be substituted as the 
named plaintiff in the consolidated actions by June 6, 2011.  He failed to do so.  
C.  Dismissal of the Consolidated Actions 
 ExxonMobil then moved to dismiss the consolidated actions under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute, on January 13, 2012.  (Suppl. App. 277b-
284b.)  The District Court granted the motion with prejudice in an order dated January 
31, 2012.  The District Court noted that Ronald Williams’ personal participation in the 
consolidated actions had been “nonexistent” and that the Court had been unable to 
contact him despite several attempts.  (Id. at 284b-287b.)  The dismissal of the 
consolidated actions did not affect Ronald Williams’ right to the $47,156.92 awarded to 
him in the interpleader action.  (Id. at 286b.) 
II. Discussion 
 As an initial matter, it is unclear what relief Benjamin seeks from this Court given 
that Ronald Williams remains entitled to collect the $47,156.92 awarded to him.  
Nevertheless, Benjamin makes several challenges to the District Court’s rulings. 
A.  Whether Benjamin was Properly Dismissed as a Party  
 We will first address Benjamin’s argument that she should not have been 
dismissed as a named plaintiff in the consolidated actions.  On April 6, 2012, The District 
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Court dismissed Benjamin as a named plaintiff because Ronald Williams was no longer a 
minor, terminating her guardianship.  The Court then provided time for Ronald Williams 
to be substituted as the real party in interest pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
17(a).  (Suppl. App. 275b-276b.)  We review the District Court’s order for abuse of 
discretion.  ICON Grp., Inc. v. Mahogany Run Dev. Corp., 829 F.2d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
 Without explanation, Benjamin urges that Appellees were judicially estopped from 
asserting that Benjamin was not the proper plaintiff in the consolidated actions.  
(Appellant Br. at 53.)  In fact, Benjamin makes no argument as to why she remains 
authorized to act on behalf of Ronald Williams.  Instead, Benjamin categorically states 
that she “represents the beneficiary based upon guardianship” 1  without citing any 
supporting authority.  (Id. at 54.)    
 Under Virgin Islands law, a “guardianship of a minor terminates upon the minor’s 
. . . emancipation or attainment of majority or as ordered by the court.”  15 V.I.C.            
§ 5-210(a).
 2
  The age of majority in the Virgin Islands is 18.  16 V.I.C. § 261.  The 
                                              
1
 Though neither party addresses it in the briefs, it appears as though the order appointing 
Benjamin as Ronald Williams’ guardian may arguably have entitled Benjamin to remain 
his guardian until he reached the age of 21.  See Benjamin v. AIG Ins. Co. of P.R., No. 
2010-0025, 2012 WL 1353527, *2 (V.I. 2012) (citing In re R. W., Super. Ct. Fam. No. 
G19/2002, slip op. at 2 (V.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 2002)). We do not know whether this is 
the reason for Benjamin’s belief that she remained Ronald Williams’ guardian 
notwithstanding her dismissal.  However, we need not decide whether Benjamin was 
entitled to remain Ronald Williams’ guardian until he turned 21 because Ronald Williams 
turned 21 on February 26, 2012 and the issue is therefore moot.  
2
 The statute governing the term of a guardianship was current at the time that the District 
Court entered its order on April 6, 2011 (the “April 6, 2011 Order”), but was repealed as 
of August 22, 2012.  The April 6, 2011 Order inadvertently cites to § 5-209(a). 
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District Court found that Ronald Williams turned 18 on February 26, 2009.  As a result, 
the District Court held that Benjamin was no longer authorized to act upon Ronald 
Williams’ behalf.  Benjamin presented no argument to the contrary.  Pursuant to Rule 
17(a), the District Court dismissed Benjamin as plaintiff, and gave Ronald Williams 60 
days to file a motion to be substituted as the real party in interest.  The District Court 
correctly applied Rule 17(a) and Virgin Islands law, and did not abuse its discretion.  We 
therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Patricia Benjamin as plaintiff in the 
consolidated actions.   
B.  Standing on Appeal 
 Having held that Benjamin was properly dismissed as a party, we are now 
presented with the question of whether she has standing to pursue the remainder of her 
appeal.  Though Appellee does not raise lack of standing as an argument in its brief, this 
Court is “required to raise issues of standing sua sponte” when they arise.  Addiction 
Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 405 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 In general, only parties of record in the District Court have standing to pursue an 
appeal.  Caplan v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 836 (3d Cir. 
1995).  However, a nonparty may have standing if particular requirements discussed in 
Caplan are met.  A nonparty may pursue an appeal if “(1) the nonparty had a stake in the 
outcome of the proceedings that is discernible from the record; (2) the nonparty has 
participated in the proceedings before the district court; and (3) the equities favor the 
appeal.”  Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 186 F.3d 346, 349 (3d Cir. 
1999).   
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 Because we hold that Benjamin was properly dismissed as a party, she must fulfill 
the nonparty standing requirements in order to pursue this appeal.  Cf. Neilson v. Colgate-
Palmolive, 199 F.3d 642, 650 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that generally only one person may 
act in a representative capacity on a minor’s behalf).  Though Benjamin satisfies the 
second nonparty standing requirement by virtue of her participation in the proceedings in 
the District Court, she does not satisfy the first or third requirements, and therefore lacks 
standing to pursue her appeal.  
  The first requirement is not satisfied because Benjamin does not have a stake in 
the outcome of the proceedings that is discernible from the record.  At no time did 
Benjamin have a personal stake in the lawsuits she filed; she acted on behalf of Ronald 
Williams who is now capable of representing his own interests.
3
     
 The third requirement is not satisfied because the equities do not favor Benjamin’s 
appeal.  Benjamin filed the consolidated actions to obtain Fitzroy Williams’ employee 
benefits from ExxonMobil on behalf of Ronald Williams.  She achieved this result when 
the District Court determined that Ronald Williams was Fitzroy Williams’ sole 
beneficiary and granted him certain benefits.  Though Ronald Williams has thus far 
neglected to collect his award, the dismissal of the consolidated actions does not affect 
his ability to do so.  Benjamin therefore does not satisfy the nonparty standing 
requirements and lacks standing to pursue this appeal.   
III. Conclusion 
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 Moreover, we cannot discern any benefit Ronald Williams would glean from this 
appeal, as he remains entitled to collect $47,156.92 as a result of the District Court’s 
rulings. 
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 We affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Benjamin as a party.  Because 
Benjamin does not satisfy the requirements for nonparty standing on appeal, we therefore 
dismiss the remainder of Benjamin’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.   
